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CONVERSATIONS ABOUT FAMILIES IN
CANADIAN COURTS AND LEGISLATURES: ARE
THERE "LESSONS" FOR THE UNITED STATES?
Mary Jane Mossman *
I. TRENDS IN CANADIAN FAMILY LAW: Two THEMES
I worry about governmental uses of relationships to serve
governmental ends, like reducing governmental financial obligations.
And I worry that by advocating expansive, functional definitions of
family in some contexts, I may be fueling this kind of governmental
control in others.I
The field of family policy is not without controversy.... [But] there
has been a new emphasis placed on strengthening families. Yet those
who applaud new family forms are suspicious of the call for "a family
policy" because they fear that it could represent a conservative agenda
opposing greater equality for women, gays, and "families of choice."
Creating social policies which bring together these two opposing
viewpoints and deal adequately with the multidimensional aspects of
family life is indeed a challenge.2
As these quotations demonstrate, issues about defining and
supporting families create dilemmas for legal and social policies in both
the United States and Canada. This Article provides an overview of
recent developments in Canadian family law, and some reflections on
whether, or to what extent, Canadian developments offer "lessons" in
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Canada. The
research assistance of Cindy L. Baldassi, LL.B., and the technical help of Hazel Pollack are warmly
appreciated.
1. Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
269, 283 (1991).
2. Maureen Baker, Thinking about Families: Trends and Policies, in CANADA'S CHANGING
FAMILIES: CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC POLICY 4 (Maureen Baker ed., 1994) [hereinafter CANADA'S
CHANGING FAMILIES].
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relation to current American initiatives that challenge ideas about
marriage, democracy, and families. For Americans seeking "lessons
beyond borders," do recent experiences in Canada provide fruitful
sources of inspiration and strategy?
In providing this brief assessment of Canadian developments, two
interconnected themes are particularly significant. One is the new
relationship between courts and legislatures in the recognition of "new
families" in Canada. Like other western jurisdictions, Canadian
legislatures have traditionally tended to enact guiding principles for
family law, leaving Canadian courts to interpret and define how these
principles should be applied in particular factual circumstances.
However, the scope for expansive interpretation in Canadian courts has
greatly increased in the past two decades, mainly as a result of
constitutionally-entrenched guarantees of equality in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter").3 As a result of the
Charter, it is courts that have provided most of the impetus for legal
recognition of "new families" in Canada, including recent decisions in
three Canadian provinces which have declared that legal principles
restricting marriage to only heterosexual couples violates the equality
guarantee in the Charter.4 In fact, many legislative reforms in Canada
have been driven by these Charter-based judicial decisions, with
legislatures often enacting reforms only after being compelled to do so
by decisions of the courts. In relation to same-sex marriage, for example,
the federal government has submitted a constitutional reference to the
Supreme Court of Canada seeking the court's guidance with respect to
proposed Parliamentary legislation.5
From an American perspective, however, this significant activism
on the part of Canadian courts and judges may reflect a critical
difference between our two countries at the present time. As a former
3. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 15(1). In a recent assessment of the Charter's impact, it was noted that the enactment
of the Charter "was a turning point for the Canadian legal and political system and culture,
prompting much speculation and a great deal of debate about what the effect of the Charter would,
and should, be." Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: A Symposium, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 215, 215 (2002) (editors' introduction).
4. See generally Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [2001] 95 B.C.L.R.3d 122, 19
R.F.L.5th 59, 71 (B.C. S.C.), overruled by Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 13
B.C.L.R.4th 1; Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 215 D.L.R.4th 223, aff'd, [2003] 225 D.L.R.4th
529; Hendricks v. Quebec (A.G.) [2002] J.Q. 3816, varied by Hendricks v. Quebec, [2003]
CarswellQue 93; see also Kathleen A. Lahey, Legal "Persons " and the Charter of Rights: Gender,
Race, and Sexuality in Canada, 77 CAN. BAR REv. 402 (1998).
5. See Kim Lunman & Drew Fagan, Marriage Divides the House, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 17,
2003, at AI.
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member of the Supreme Court of Canada suggested a few years ago,
constitutional interpretation in Canada, particularly in relation to human
rights jurisprudence, has increasingly diverged from United States
approaches because Canada's constitution reflects the culture of
international human rights in the late twentieth century:
The United States Bill of Rights reads quite differently than most
twentieth-century constitutions, which are drafted in language which
has its sources in European and international human rights
conventions, are more detailed, and frequently expressly permit
limitations of the enumerated rights, either within the rights themselves
or as a general limitation provision.
6
Thus, Canadian family law currently reveals a pattern of activism
on the part of courts and judges in interpreting the Charter's guarantees
to recognize "new families" in law, with legislative reform frequently
flowing out of this judicial decision making. Whether this pattern offers
useful "lessons" for the United States, in the context of a different
culture of constitutional rights, is an important question for those
seeking family law reform.
A second and related theme in recent Canadian developments is the
relationship between families and the state with respect to responsibility
for dependent "family" members. In addition to active intervention in
the legal recognition of "new families," Canadian courts have also been
active in defining "new family obligations," including much expanded
entitlement to ongoing spousal support, and obligations to pay child
support for both biological and non-biological children, after separation
or divorce. 7 Recent federal and provincial legislation has similarly
confirmed that the primary obligation for support for children after
separation or divorce rests with their parents, rather than the State.8 In all
of these contexts, primary responsibility for dependent individuals has
been assigned to (former) family members and governmental support for
dependency has declined.9 In the context of social security, moreover,
6. The Hon. Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 32 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Monkman v. Beaulieu, [2000] 149 Man. R.2d 295 (extending child support
requirements to step-children as well as biological children); Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1
S.C.R. 420 (grounding ongoing support on spouse's need).
8. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice, Canada, Parenting After Divorce, at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/pad/about/ (last updated Apr. 24, 2003) (discussing current and
proposed legislation).
9. See Sherri Torjman, Crests and Crashes: The Changing Tides of Family Income Security,
in CANADA'S CHANGING FAMILIES: CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC POLICY 69 (Maureen Baker ed., 1994)-
(indicating a trend of shrinking reliance by Canadian families on government resources); see also
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several Canadian legislatures have significantly reduced the level of
payments to needy individuals and families in recent years, and the
Ontario legislature (re)defined family relationships in 1995 so as to
disentitle sole support mothers who formed any kind of attachment to
male persons. 10 Interestingly, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently
declared that this legislative action contravened the Charter, striking
down the relevant legislative provisions.1  Thus, paradoxically,
expansive judicial intervention that has recognized "new families" and
"new family obligations" in the family law context has also been
employed to strike down a legislative effort to create family
relationships for sole-support mothers and thus disentitle them from
continuing to receive financial assistance from the state. Although the
Charter was once again significant in creating scope for this judicial
activism, it is important to explore the underlying principles used by
courts to define the obligations for families and for the state in these
differing contexts of economic dependency. Moreover, since the Ontario
Court of Appeal rejected the government's argument that its legislation
was justified by the need to treat married and cohabiting couples in the
same way,12 these principles may offer useful "lessons" for the
American context.
This Article begins with an overview of Canadian developments in
relation to the recognition of "new families." As explained above, this
part of the Article focuses primarily on judicial decisions, but it also
includes references to some legislative reforms that have resulted from
Charter claims. The Article then provides an overview of recent
developments concerning "new family obligations" and the relationship
between family and state responsibilities for economic dependency. In
this context, both judicial and legislative actions frequently intersect. In
relation to these two themes, the Article also focuses on some recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada which may signal a change in
direction in relation to ideas about "new families," "new family
obligations," or both, and on recent governmental policies concerning
the definition and regulation of "families."1 3 In this context, the Article
Mary Jane Mossman, Child Support or Support for Children? Re-Thinking "Public " and "Private"
in Family Law, 46 UNIV. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 63, 81 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Falkiner v. Ontario, [2002] 59 O.R.3d 481, 484-85.
11. See id. at 513-14; see also ANDY MITCHELL ET AL., FIVE YEARS LATER: WELFARE RATE
CUTS ANNIVERSARY REPORT 2 (2000).
12. See Falkiner, 59 O.R.3d at 511.
13. See, e.g., LAW COMM'N OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND
SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001) [hereinafter LCC REPORT]; DEP'T
OF JUSTICE CANADA, MARRIAGE AND LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX UNIONS (2002)
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offers some reflections on the extent to which there may be Canadian
"lessons" that are relevant to current concerns about marriage,
democracy, and families in the United States.
II. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS ABOUT FAMILIES IN CANADA
A. "New Families ": The Impact of Charter Jurisprudence
As in many western countries, Canada traditionally used marriage
as the legal marker for "family."' 14 However, by 1995, married couples
with children at home constituted only forty-five percent of all families
in Canada, a figure that had fallen from sixty-four percent in 1961.'
Demographically, opposite-sex cohabitees have represented an
increasing proportion of all Canadian families; in the province of
Qudbec, for example, nearly fifty percent of babies were born in 1993 to
mothers who were not legally married, and most of these births were to
cohabiting couples. 16 Precise numbers about same-sex couples are more
elusive, although questions were included, for the first time, about same-
sex couples in the census in 2001.17 The number of sole-parent families
has also been rising; in 1995, for example, twenty-two percent of
Canadian families were headed by only one parent, and in eighty percent
of these families, the single parent was female.' 8 And, the proportion of
blended families or step-families had also increased to about ten percent
of all families in 1995.19 Moreover, recent longitudinal studies have
tracked the dynamic nature of family life; as one commentator
suggested, "the modem Canadian family is like a giant amoeba,
constantly joining, splitting and rejoining in new configurations. 2 °
However, the statistics also suggest that there are significant differences
[hereinafter LEGAL RECOGNITION], available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/mar/
index.html.
14. See Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millenium: The Assimilation of
Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 117 (2000).
15. See Elaine Carey, 'Alternate' Families Outweigh Tradition, TORONTO STAR (METRO
EDITION), June 20, 1996, at A2 (quoting STATISTICS CANADA, CANADIAN FAMILIES: DIVERSITY
AND CHANGE (1996)).
16. See Younger Couples Choose Not Marry, TORONTO STAR (METRO EDITION), June 14,
1995, at All.
17. See Elaine Carey, Are You Gay? How Next Year's Census Will Pop the Question,
TORONTO STAR (METRO EDITION), May 7, 2000, at Al.
18. See Carey, supra note 15.
19. Seeid
20. Figures Reflect Changing Family Scene, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 12, 1996, at A 10.
2003]
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in levels of household income in different kinds of families, with single-
mother families most at risk of living below the poverty line.2'
Traditionally, there has been some legal recognition of "family
status" for opposite-sex couples who are not married, but such
recognition for same-sex couples is relatively recent.22 Thus, in the
twentieth century, a patchwork of legislative provisions across Canada
provided some legal recognition for "spouses" in opposite-sex couples in
defined circumstances.23 In addition, provincial family law statutes,
which defined the entitlement of former spouses to ongoing financial
support after separation, expanded the definition of "spouse" to include
opposite-sex cohabitees.24 Although these same provincial statutes also
created principles for property sharing at separation or divorce, these
principles were reserved for married couples only; they were not
available to opposite-sex cohabitees.2 5 Thus, although there was some
legal recognition of opposite-sex couples as "families" in Canada, such
families were nonetheless still excluded from some legal benefits
provided to married couples.
However, same-sex cohabitees were not generally recognized at all
in federal or provincial legislation, and there were a number of
unsuccessful challenges to their exclusion from legal recognition as
"families" even prior to the Charter.2 6 After the enactment of the
Charter in the 1980s, however, the number of litigation challenges to the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits of "family status"
increased, although initially they were not often successful. The lack of
success of the first litigation challenges resulted from two problems:
21. See VANIER INSTITUTE OF THE FAMILY, PROFILING CANADA'S FAMILIES 77 (1994)
(stating that ninety-five percent of single-mother families with no earners lived below the poverty
line in 1991). See generally VANIER INSTITUTE OF THE FAMILY, PROFILING CANADA'S FAMILIES 11
(2000).
22. See Nicholas Bala, A lternatives for Extending Spousal Status in Canada, 17 CAN. J. FAM.
L. 169, 192-93 (2000).
23. See LCC REPORT, supra note 13, at 116; Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act,
ch. 12, 2000 S.C. (Can.) (extending certain spousal benefits under Canadian federal law to
"common-law partners").
24. See, e.g., Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A., 2002, ch. A-4.5 (Alb.); Family
Maintenance Act, R.S.M., 1987, ch. F20 (Man.).
25. See, e.g., Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 1 (1990) (Ont,) (defining "spouse," which
applies in relation to property-sharing in Parts I and II of the Family Law Act). The courts have
developed a lively jurisprudence to award proprietary interests to cohabitees, including both same-
sex and opposite-sex cohabitees, pursuant to the equitable doctrines of unjust enrichment and
constructive trust. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY (1993); see
also Regnier v. O'Reilly, [1997] 39 B.C.L.R.3d 178 (applying equitable principles to a will
challenge brought by decedent's same-sex partner).
26. See generally Martha A. McCarthy & Joanna L. Radbord, Family Law for Same Sex
Couples: Chart(er)ing the Course, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101 (1998).
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first, sexual orientation was not included as a prohibited ground of
discrimination in the Charter,27 and second, early equality jurisprudence
under the Charter strongly reflected the "similarly situated" test in
American jurisprudence.28 However, beginning with Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia29 in 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada
began to articulate a new approach to equality jurisprudence that focused
on the historic disadvantage experienced by persons such as a claimant
in relation to immutable personal characteristics.3 ° In addition, by the
early 1990's, courts in Canada held that sexual orientation was an
"analogous ground" to those listed in the Charter as prohibited grounds
of discrimination.3' In the context of these developments in Charter
jurisprudence, challenges to the exclusion of same-sex couples began to
attract judicial support. For example, a 1992 decision held that the policy
of the Canadian Armed Forces excluding homosexuals contravened the
32Charter. In relation to family status, moreover, a judge in Ontario
wrote a compelling opinion in 1993, dissenting from the majority view
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not infringe
the Charter,33 and a judge in British Columbia declared that a same-sex
partner was entitled as a "spouse" to medical coverage under his
partner's insurance plan.34 Thus, although the issue of marriage for
same-sex couples remained contested, same-sex partners were gradually
being recognized by courts as entitled to equality of treatment and to
some of the benefits of "family status."
27. Section 15 of the Charter includes a list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, but
jurisprudence now recognizes "analogous" grounds, including sexual orientation. See, e.g., Egan v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 528-29; Haig v. Canada, [1992] 9 O.R.3d 495, 500.
28. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ontario, [1988] 49 D.L.R.4th 584, 589 (finding that same-sex
couples are not similarly situated as heterosexual couples and refusing to include same-sex partners
as dependents under the Health Insurance Act).
29. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (challenging the requirement of citizenship for application for
admission as a lawyer in British Columbia).
30. See id. at 171 (McIntyre, J., dissenting in part) ("It is clear that the purpose of s. 15 is to
ensure equality in the formulation and application of the law. The promotion of equality entails the
promotion of a society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as
human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. It has a large remedial
component") (emphasis added). For an overview of equality jurisprudence, see The Hon. Claire
L'Heureux-Dubd, What a Difference a Decade Makes: The Canadian Constitution and the Family
Since 1991, 27 QUEEN'S L.J. 361 (2001).
31. SeeHaig, 9 O.R.3dat 501.
32. See Douglas v. Canada, [1992] 98 D.L.R.4th 129, 134-40.
33. See Layland v. Ontario, [1993] 14 O.R.3d 658, 667-82 (Greer, J., dissenting).
34. See Knodel v. British Columbia, [1991] 58 B.C.L.R.2d 256, 1991 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS
33837, at *72-73.
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In this context, the Supreme Court of Canada decided two cases in
1995 that required it to assess the fundamental nature of marriage, and to
determine whether it was legally distinguishable from cohabiting
relationships, including both opposite-sex and same-sex relationships.
The court released decisions simultaneously in Miron v. Trudel,
35
concerning opposite-sex cohabitees, and in Egan v. Canada,36
concerning same-sex cohabitees. In Miron, John Miron claimed accident
benefits for injuries which he sustained in an automobile accident, on the
basis that he was the "spouse" of the insured, his cohabitee Jocelyne
Valliere.37 The insurance company refused to pay the benefits, claiming
that the word "spouse" in the insurance policy was limited to married
couples only.38 Although the insurance company succeeded in the lower
courts, five of nine judges in the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
policy discriminated on the basis of marital status, and that the
discrimination could not be justified pursuant to section 1 of the
Charter.39 Among other reasons for their different conclusions, the
dissenting judges expressed concern that "where individuals choose not
to marry, it would undermine the choice they have made if the state were
to impose upon them the very same burdens and benefits which it
imposes on married persons. ' 4° In spite of such concerns, however,
Miron clearly established that a majority of the court was determined to
adopt a functional approach to married and cohabiting relationships, and
the benefits flowing from such relationships.
In the related case, Egan, the claimant was a partner in a gay
relationship which had existed since 1948.41 When his partner became
entitled to a pension pursuant to the Old Age Security Act, the claimant
applied for an allowance that was payable to the "spouse" of a recipient
within a married or cohabiting heterosexual relationship.42 His claim was
rejected by the government, and, with the exception of one dissenting
opinion, the lower courts held that there was no discrimination in this
case. 43 In the Supreme Court of Canada, however, all of the judges
35. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
36. [199512 S.C.R. 513.
37. See Miron, 2 S.C.R. at 430-32.
38. Seeid. at431.
39. See id. at 465-511. Section 1 of the Charter is an express "limit" in relation to
constitutional violations. Thus, a violation may be upheld if it is a "reasonable limit[] prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONST. (Constitution
Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
40. Miron, 2 S.C.R. at 450 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
41. See Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.
42. See id.
43. See generally Egan v. Canada, [1993] 3 F.C. 401; Egan v. Canada, [1992] 1 F.C. 687.
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accepted that sexual orientation was an analogous ground of
discrimination pursuant to the Charter, and five of nine judges held that
the denial of the claim constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.44 However, one of these five judges also held that the
discriminatory treatment could be justified pursuant to section 1 of the
Charter.45 Thus, in the end, the claim was unsuccessful by a vote of five
to four, with the majority asserting that marriage and opposite-sex
cohabitation could be distinguished from all other societal units because
of "the biological and social realities" of heterosexual relationships.46
Both of these cases have continuing significance for defining
"families" in Canada, although most of the subsequent litigation has
focused on Egan, at least until very recently.47 Thus, in 1998, the
Supreme Court of Canada redefined the "pressing and substantial" test
for justifying discriminatory legislation pursuant to section 1,48 and the
federal government then announced that it would forego an appeal from
Ontario that had decided that the exclusion of same-sex partners as
"spouses" in relation to tax benefits in pension plans constituted
unjustifiable discrimination.49 More significantly, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided in May of 1999 that provincial legislation that excluded
same-sex couples from entitlement to post-separation spousal support
contravened the equality guarantee in the Charter and was not justified
pursuant to section 1.50 As a result, Ontario amended the definition of
"spouse" to include same-sex couples, on the same basis as opposite-sex
couples, in sixty-seven provincial statutes in late 1999; significantly, the
provincial government's reluctance was aptly reflected in the name of
the amending legislation, An Act to Amend Certain Statutes Because of
the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H.51 In early 2000, the
44. See Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 572 (Sopinka, J., concurring).
45. See id. (Sopinka, J., concurring) (agreeing with four other justices that the distinction
constituted discrimination contrary to section 15 of the Charter, but holding that the "infringement
[was] saved" under section 1).
46. Id. at 536.
47. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] 38 O.R.3d 577, 582-84 (finding that the
exclusion of tax benefits on the grounds of sexual orientation violates section 1 of the Charter); M.
v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 25 (analysing whether the definition of"spouse" in section 29 of Ontario's
Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3 (1990) (Ont.), infringes section 15(1) of the Charter, and, if so,
whether the legislation is saved by section 1 of the Charter).
48. See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 554-57; see also Brenda Cossman, Lesbians,
Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 223, 231-32
(2002).
49. See Rosenberg, 38 O.R.3d 577 (applying the principles enunciated in Vriend).
50. See M v. H., 2 S.C.R. at 26-27.
51. Ch. 6, 1999 S.O. (Ont.) The amending legislation was enacted in October 1999, just
barely within the timeframe permitted by the court in M v. H. See M v. H., 2 S.C.R. at 87
2003]
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federal government similarly enacted amendments to provide for the
extension of benefits to same-sex couples in federal statutes.52
Significantly, however, the federal legislation included an interpretation
section, which was added during Parliamentary debate, stating that,
"[flor greater certainty, the amendments made by this Act do not affect
the meaning of the word 'marriage,' that is, the lawful union of one man
and one woman to the exclusion of all others.,
53
In this context, the Supreme Court's decision in M v. H., and the
legislation that resulted from it, confirmed that same-sex couples were
entitled to "family status." Yet marriage still remained the preserve of
heterosexual couples. However, shortly after the decision in M v. H.,
same-sex marriage cases were initiated in the courts of three Canadian
provinces: British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. In October of 2001, a
single judge in a British Columbia court decided that the common law
limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples did not constitute
discrimination pursuant to the Charter, and that if there was
discrimination, it was justified under section 1.54 By contrast, in July
2002, a three member Ontario court unanimously held that the
prohibition against same-sex marriage did constitute discrimination and
was not justified pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.55 The Qu6bec
court followed the decision of the Ontario court.56 Although all of these
decisions necessarily engaged with the nuances of,...Charter
jurisprudence, one of the judgments in the Ontario court explicitly
addressed the nature of marriage from a historical and societal
perspective. 57 Identifying the procreation function as the basis for the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the entitlement to marry, Justice
Blair assessed the competing arguments and concluded that "[t]he
underlying question, then, is whether the law in Canada today is
sufficiently open and adaptable to recognize a broader rationale as the
(lacobucci, J.) (suspending the severance of the offending section of the Family Law Act for six
months to permit the legislature to assess the decision's impact on other statutes with similar
definitions).
52. See Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, ch. 12, 2000 S.C. (Can.).
53. Id. § 1.1.
54. See Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [2001] 95 B.C.L.R.3d 122, 19 R.F.L.5th 59, 71,
overruled by Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1.
55. See generally Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), [2002] 215 D.L.R.4th 223, aff'd, [2003] 225
D.L.R.4th 529.
56. See Hendricks v. Qudbec (A.G.), [2002] J.Q. 3816, varied by Hendricks v. Qu6bec,
[2003] CarswellQue 93.
57. See Halpern, 60 O.R.3d at 345-55 (Blair, R.S.J., concurring).
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defining characteristic of marriage than heterosexual procreation and its
surrounding religious paraphernalia. In my view, it is."
58
In early 2003, the British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the
appeal in that province, but ordered that its decision would be suspended
for two years to permit appropriate legislative action. 59 In early June of
2003, the Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision confirming the
lower court decision in Ontario; however, the Ontario appellate court
held that there was no reason to suspend its declaration of invalidity.6°
As a result, same-sex marriage became available in Ontario on June 10,
2003. A subsequent motion in the British Columbia court a few weeks
later, requesting that the court's suspension be lifted, was unopposed by
the federal and provincial governments. 61 Thus, same-sex marriage is
currently available in the provinces of Ontario and British Columbia.
Even this brief overview demonstrates how significant the
Charter's human rights protections have proved to be for advocates of
same-sex family status, and even marriage: the broad scope for judicial
activism pursuant to the Charter has been critical to the legal recognition
of same-sex families. By contrast, legislatures in Canada have tended to
play "catch up" as and when judicial decisions have required them to
act. As a result, it is courts that have primarily shaped and expanded
legal definitions of "families" in Canada in recent years. Thus, although
the federal government established a Parliamentary committee to
examine the issue of same-sex marriage, and the federal Department of
Justice issued a discussion paper in the fall of 2002;62 they have been
overtaken by these judicial decisions. As a result, the federal government
has decided that legislation must be enacted to ensure uniformity of
marriage law (a matter within federal constitutional jurisdiction)
throughout Canada, and the government has now submitted a
constitutional reference to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine
how to shape such legislation to conform to Charter requirements.63 In
this context, it appears that Parliament is seeking direction from the
court with respect to its constitutional obligation to extend marriage to
same-sex couples in all provinces and territories.
Yet, the "success" of this human rights litigation for gay and
lesbian families masks an important aspect of the litigation process: the
58. Id. at 356 (Blair, R.S.J., concurring).
59. See Egale Canada Inc., [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.4th at 161.
60. See Halpern, [2003] 225 D.L.R.4th at 456.
61. See Egale Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2003] 15 B.C.L.R.4th 226.
62. See LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 13.
63. See Lunman & Fagan, supra note 5.
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fact that it has required advocates to argue that same-sex relationships
are functionally the same as heterosexual relationships. As scholars in
both Canada and the United States have argued,64 this emphasis on
functional similarity may necessitate the suppression of individual
aspirations and undermine the efforts of same-sex couples (particularly
lesbians) to (re)define their intimate relationships "outside" the law.
65
Yet, while their family relationships may not be fully recognized by law,
the family lives of same-sex couples are nonetheless shaped by law, at
least in some respects. As Shelley Gavigan argued, "[1]esbians do not
live outside the law in a kind of legal limbo, nor do they exist in a legal
vacuum." 66 In their engagement with the courts, both in human rights
challenges and in other family law disputes, and in the law's definition
of family rights and responsibilities, same-sex couples are both shaping
and being shaped by legal and social relations in Canada. Thus,
according to Gavigan, the "success" of a test case in Ontario, which
permitted the lesbian partners of biological mothers to legally adopt their
children, was flawed because it required the court to hold that the
partners were "spouses."
As profound as the challenge of the lesbian adoptions is, it is clear that
striking down of the opposite sex requirement alone does not, cannot,
address the constraints and assumptions that are embedded in the
adoption legislation in Ontario. Under this legislation, it is not enough
for the lesbian social parents to be "parents." In order to make a joint
application.... they must also be spouses .... In order for the lesbian
parents to be full parents, they had to be spouses, same-sex spouses to
be sure, but spouses nonetheless.
67
Thus, while it is clear that human rights challenges pursuant to the
Charter have succeeded in expanding the legal definition of families to
include same-sex couples, issues about precisely how to define families
64. See Katherine Arnup, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families. Legal Obstacles, Legal
Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 907, 907-08 (1986); Nancy Polikoff, "'Mothers Just
Like Others ": Lesbians, Divorce, and Child Custody in Canada, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 18, 30-31
(1989).
65. See, e.g., Susan B. Boyd, Lesbian (and Gay) Custody Claims. What Difference Does
Difference Make?, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 131, 139-42 (1998); see also Susan B. Boyd, Family, Law
and Sexuality: Feminist Engagements, 8 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 369, 381-82 (1999); Cossman, supra
note 48, at 241-42.
66. Shelley A. M. Gavigan, A Parent(ly) Knot: Can Heather Have Two Mommies?, in LEGAL
INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 103 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin
eds., 1995).
67. Shelley A. M. Gavigan, Legal Forms, Family Forms, Gendered Norms: What is a
Spouse?, 14 CAN. J. L. & SOC'Y 127, 156 (1999).
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in law remain profoundly contested and challenging. In this context, a
major report of the Law Commission of Canada attempted in 2001 to
reexamine fundamental issues for defining families in Canada in the
twenty-first century, 68 but its impact has been muted by the same-sex
marriage debate. The report's significance for future developments in
Canada is addressed later in this Article.69
B. "New Family Obligations ": Responsibilities for Dependency for
Families and the State
In spite of law's acceptance of the ideas of autonomy and
independence for individuals within classical liberalism, it is evident that
"dependence can be viewed as a necessary part of the human
condition., 70 Although age, infirmity, and other conditions may render
an individual adult dependent, children are inevitably dependent when
they are born, even though the extent of their continuing dependence
into adulthood varies according to economic and other circumstances
within their families. Economic dependence may also occur for adult
caregivers, whose ability to continue to engage in paid work is
compromised by their care-giving responsibilities, a situation which
commonly affects custodial parents (usually mothers) at separation or
divorce. More systemically, governmental economic policies that
assume a level of national unemployment contribute to the economic
dependency of workers and their families, as do levels of minimum
wages that do not result in family incomes above the poverty line. 71 Yet,
recognizing that economic dependence is part of everyday life is much
easier than determining who is responsible to support dependent
individuals and families.
Although Canada has a history of support for publicly funded
health-care, education, and other social services, the division of
legislative authority between the federal and provincial governments has
often inhibited coordinated policy initiatives in relation to social
security.72 In the context of governmental concerns about deficit
reduction in recent decades, moreover, there has been a trend to replace
68. See generally LCC REPORT, supra note 13.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 147-6 1.
70. Pamela Symes, Property, Power and Dependence: Critical Family Law, 14 J.L. & Soc'Y
199, 202 (1987).
71. See generally Torjman, supra note 9; Linda Duxbury & Christopher Higgins, Families in
the Economy, in CANADA'S CHANGING FAMILIES, supra note 2, at 29.
72. See Maureen Baker, The Effectiveness of Family and Social Policies, in CANADA'S
CHANGING FAMILIES, supra note 2, at 129.
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universal programs with benefits that target the poor and disadvantaged,
an approach which has arguably reinforced the stigma of poverty.73 In
addition, some of these changes have been reflected in judicial decisions
about responsibilities for economic support for dependent family
members.74 As sociologist Margrit Eichler argued, familial obligations to
provide support may have both functional and normative aspects:
As far as the support function of families is concerned, there is
widespread consensus that families not only do support their own, but
should do so. What is often overlooked is that there tends to be a direct
opposition between the notion of the family as a support system and
social security programmes: to the degree that the proper locus of
support for an individual is seen to lie within that individual's family,
the individual becomes disentitled from public support.
[T]o the degree that we make social security programmes available to
individuals, we guarantee, as a society, some income security to
individuals. Conversely, to the degree that we let eligibility for the
social security programmes be determined by family status, we
disentitle individuals from access to social support on the basis of their
family status. This disentitlement is usually justified by reference to
the support function of "the family"...75
In my view, the trend of judicial decision making and legislative
initiatives in the past two decades has reflected an expansion of the
scope of family obligations for dependent individuals, with a
corresponding reduction in the role of state support for dependency.
Moreover, this trend has not simply occurred as a result of the functional
vacuum created by the state's retreat from social security programs, but
has also been characterized in normative terms. Thus, in spite of
permanent separation or the finality of a divorce order, former spouses
and their children have been categorized by the Supreme Court of
Canada as a "post-divorce family unit" who should have continuing
economic and other obligations to provide support for dependent family
73. See Torjman, supra note 9, at 71.
74. See Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, 438 ("[A spousal support award] places
the primary burden of support for a needy partner... on the partners to the relationship, rather than
on the state, recognizing the potential injustice of foisting a helpless former partner onto the public
assistance rolls.").
75. MARGRIT EICHLER, FAMILIES IN CANADA TODAY 110 (1983).
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members.76 This development was evident in relation to the issue of
ongoing financial support after separation or divorce. For example,
although the Supreme Court of Canada appeared to narrow the
circumstances for enforcing responsibilities of ongoing spousal support
in 1987 in the Pelech trilogy of cases, 77 even when former spouses had
negotiated a binding separation agreement that limited their continuing
economic relationship,78 the principles of spousal support have
increasingly been interpreted as recognizing ongoing obligations of the
"post-divorce family unit." Significantly, the principles were initially
expanded to recognize a need to provide effective compensation to
former spouses (particularly wives) for their contributions to unpaid
labour during the marriage. 79 Thus, in 1992, the Supreme Court of
Canada expressly recognized "the feminization of poverty [as] an
entrenched social phenomenon" in Canada,80 and declared that the
objectives of spousal support set out in the Divorce Act (which included
compensation for the disadvantages of marriage or its breakdown)
required Mr. Moge to continue to pay spousal support to his former wife
almost twenty years after they had separated.8' Judicial recognition of
this "family obligation" was further expanded in 1999, when the
Supreme Court of Canada determined in Bracklow v. Bracklow82 that
economic need on the part of a former spouse was all that was required
to ground the obligation of a former family member to provide support.
83
As Chief Justice McLachlin stated, the "mutual obligation" view of
marriage recognizes that spouses' lives become intermingled as a result
of cohabitation over a period of time in a family relationship, and that it
is unrealistic to assume that all separating couples will be able to move
immediately from mutual support to absolute independence.84 In
76. See Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R 627, 702 (McLachlin & L'Heureux-Dub6, JJ.,
dissenting).
77. See generally Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 857; Caron v. Caron, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892.
78. See Richardson, 1 S.C.R. at 866 (explaining that the Pelech line of cases suggests that it is
within a court's discretion to alter a settlement agreement in the event there has been a "radical
change in the circumstances of a former spouse," provided that the change is the product of
"economic dependency generated by the marriage relationship").
79. See generally LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, MAINTENANCE ON DIVORCE (Working
Paper No. 12, 1975), microformed on Canada Law Reform Commission (William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc.).
80. Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813,99 D.L.R.4th 456, 482.
81. See id, 99 D.L.R.4th at 479-85; see also Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3, § 15(7)(a) (1985),
amended by ch. 1, 1997 S.C. § 15.2(6)(a) (2d Supp. 1997) (Can.).
82. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420.
83. See id. at 448.
84. Id. at 437-38.
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addition, however, she suggested that this view of marriage "places the
primary burden of support for a needy partner who cannot attain post-
marital self-sufficiency on the partners to the relationship, rather than on
the state, recognizing the potential injustice of foisting a helpless former
partner onto the public assistance rolls." 5
These cases revealed the court's commendable recognition of the
precarious financial circumstances experienced by many women after
separation and divorce, and they took into account both the need to
compensate women for their unpaid contributions in intact families, as
well as the post-divorce circumstances that often lead to economic need
even in the absence of compensatory entitlement. This recognition is, of
course, laudable in terms of ensuring that legal principles reflect the
economic reality of women's lives. At the same time, however, both
Moge and Bracklow conflated the clear economic need of former
spouses (mostly women) with an assertion that the obligation to respond
to this need belonged entirely to (former) family members, and not to the
state. Of course, in a context in which the state was withdrawing
support, any other decision would leave dependent family members in
poverty. Yet, these judicial decisions may create difficulty in cases
where former spouses, unlike those in Moge and Bracklow, do not have
sufficient financial resources to support both current and former
families. Regardless of these issues, however, my point here is the
narrower one of demonstrating how these decisions evidence a shift
away from state-funded support programs for dependents and towards
"new family obligations." More significantly, because of the expanded
definition of "spouse" in family law legislation, these new family
obligations extend to former cohabitees, both opposite-sex and (as a
result of M v. H.) same-sex partners. In this way, both the expansion of
the category "spouse" and the shift to family, rather than state,
obligations for economic support for dependency work together to make
the family, including the "post-divorce family," the primary site for
ensuring economic security for individuals.
These conclusions in relation to spousal support obligations were
also reflected in the enactment of a system of national child support
guidelines in 1997,6 prescribing tables for defining the amount payable
on the part of a non-custodial parent for their children after separation or
85. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
86. Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R./97-175, amended by S.O.R./O1-292, available
at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/sup/grli/ligfed.html (last updated Apr. 24, 2003).
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divorce.87 In this context, the state opted to use its resources to enforce
support payments by parents, rather than to transfer benefits, economic
and social, directly to children.88 Moreover, both the federal and
provincial statutes define "parent" so as to include non-biological
children for whom an adult stands "in the place of a parent." Thus, in its
1999 decision in Chartier v. Chartier,89 the Supreme Court of Canada
ordered a former husband to pay child support to his former wife, not
only for their biological child but also for the wife's child from a
previous relationship because he had stood "in the place of a parent" to
this child.90 In this case, the adults had been married for only a little over
one year,91 and although the court's decision was consistent with the
authorities in Canada,92 its policy implications were questioned by a
commentator on the Chartier case:
The fact that adults live together does not amount to a commitment
that they will remain together. Many relationships are of short
duration. Many people are not inclined to make the accommodations
necessary to ensure that their relationship will continue. In light of this,
should the courts impose a long-term financial commitment on a
person who was pleasant to a partner's child for a short time? The
Supreme Court of Canada apparently believes that it should.
The task facing many lawyers will be to advise their clients on how to
prevent that from happening to them. It appears that the only way to
prevent a long-term child-support commitment is never to establish a
parent-child relationship with a partner's child. Social scientists will
have to decide whether that is a good way to force people to interact.
93
Notwithstanding these concerns, Canadian courts have tended to
enforce parental relationships with non-biological children, even when
the relationship with a child's parent has terminated.94 As a recent
87. See Canada Department of Justice, Federal Child Support Amounts: Simplified Tables, at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/sup/grl/Pdftab.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2003).
88. See Julien D. Payne, Spousal and Child Support after Moge, Willick and Levesque, 12
CAN. FAM. L. Q. 261, 298-99 (1995) (critiquing legislated child support guidelines as not likely "to
resolve the economic crisis of separation and divorce for women and children").
89. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242, 168 D.L.R.4th 540.
90. See id., 168 D.L.R.4th at 557.
91. See id. at 543.
92. See id. at 556-57.
93. J.G. McLeod, Annotation to Chartier v. Chartier (1999), 43 R.F.L.4th 1, 4.
94. See, e.g., Samson v. Samson, [2003] 2003 N.L.C. LEXIS 140 at 24 (holding that when
respondent took on role of father figure for eleven years to his wife's children from prior
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decision in Manitoba declared, "[j]ust as the status of a biological parent
continues after the relationship between the adults has ceased, so one
who stands in loco parentis continues to do so after cohabitation ceases.
Neither bond can be unilaterally terminated by a parent." 95 Although
there are important policy issues about law and family relationships in
such cases, my point here is to demonstrate the shift in responsibility for
dependency, once again, from the state to the "family," including the
"post-divorce family."
In addition to this shift in family law principles, legislative changes
concerning social security have also tended to limit state obligations for
dependency. For example, when the newly-elected government in
Ontario wished to implement its election promises about reducing the
welfare rolls in 1995,96 it adopted two strategies: reducing levels of
welfare payments by over twenty percent, and redefining "spousal"
relationships.9 v Poverty activists challenged both of these actions, using
the Charter. In relation to the government's right to set the levels of
welfare payments, the challenge was unsuccessful, with the courts
deferring to the legislature. 98 However, after protracted procedural
challenges, the Ontario Court of Appeal held in 2002 that the new
definition of "spouse" in the 1995 legislation violated the equality
guarantee of the Charter.99 The definition particularly affected single
mother families in receipt of welfare if the mother resided with a male
with whom she shared any expenses. The claimants were all single
mothers who were living with men who were not the fathers of their
children, and they had arrangements for sharing rent, food costs, and
other household expenses.' 00 They argued that, pursuant to Ontario law,
none of these male cohabitees had responsibility to provide financial
support to the mothers or their children. 10' Significantly, some of the
mothers had previously experienced abusive relationships and were
hoping that these new relationships might become permanent, but they
all wished to "test" the relationships for a time and to maintain their
relationships, he stood in the place of a parent and was obligated for their support upon divorce
from their mother); Beaudry v. Gillcash, [2001] 2001 Man. R.2d LEXIS 272 at*5 (granting
visitation to a non-biological parent who was "the only father [the child had] ever known").
95. Monkman v. Beaulieu, [2000] 149 Man. R.2d 295, T 15.
96. See Betsy Powell, Tory Squad to Retrace Path of NDP Probe, THE RECORD, Aug. 21,
1995, at A3.
97. See id.
98. See Masse v. Ontario, [1996] 134 D.L.R.4th 20, 42 (finding no right to social assistance
benefits as the legislature was free to repeal or amend the statutes providing for it).
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financial independence from these male partners while doing so. 10 2 In
characterizing the regulations as violations of the Charter's equality
guarantee, the court stated:
[T]he impact [of the Regulations] is severe, compromising, as it does,
the respondents' ability to meet their own and their children's basic
needs. Because of the definition, each [claimant] lost her entitlement to
social assistance as a single person.
Beyond purely financial concerns, more fundamental dignity
interests of the [claimants] have been affected. Being reclassified as a
spouse forces the [claimants] and other single mothers in similar
circumstances to give up either their financial independence or their
relationship.... Forcing them to become financially dependent on
men with whom they have at best try-on relationships strikes at the
core of their human dignity. 1
03
Thus, while the governmental regulation defining "spouse" in
relation to welfare entitlement was consistent with family, rather than
state, support for dependency, this judicial decision in the welfare
context reassigned responsibility for the economic dependency of single-
mother families to the state. Clearly, this judicial decision appears
initially incongruous with cases that have expanded "family obligations"
in the family law context. At the outset, it may be possible to find a
distinction in the fact that "family obligations" were enforced, in cases
like Moge and Bracklow, where the "spouses" had been married. By
contrast, support obligations are not generally enforceable against
cohabitees until their relationships meet the legislative threshold for
liability, usually by the expiration of a three-year period or the birth or
adoption of a child.10 4 Thus, the claimants in Falkiner argued that they
suffered discrimination because they were treated differently, and less
advantageously, than single mother families who were not in receipt of
welfare payments. 10 5 Moreover, since their cohabiting partners acquired
no legal responsibility to support them until the expiration of the three-
year period, the claimants were particularly vulnerable in their economic
dependency. 
106
These arguments may be important in relation to governmental
assertions that welfare programs, and particularly these impugned
102. See id. at 485, 495-96.
103. See id. at 512 (emphasis added).
104. See Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, §§ 29-30 (1990) (Ont.).
105. See Falkiner, 59 O.R.3d at 503.
106. See id. at 513-14.
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regulations, were consciously designed to ensure equality in the
treatment of married and cohabiting (opposite-sex) couples.10 7 In
rejecting this argument, the court held that the definition of "spouse" in
the regulations did not "capture spousal relationships reasonably
accurately [because] it embrace[d] many relationships that [were] not
marriage-like in their economic component." 10 8 From this perspective,
the court struck down legislation that was designed to reduce welfare
expenditures by creating "new family" relationships. Thus, although the
legislation did not function to encourage marriage per se, as does the
recent proposal in the United States,'0 9 the overall purpose of the Ontario
statute was to transform relationships into "families" and to replace state
support for economic dependency with "new family obligations." In
striking down the definition of "spouse" in welfare legislation, the court
thus established one limit on the extent to which governments may
transfer responsibility for dependency from the state to families.
However, other than this limited situation, Canadian family law policy
has tended to create expectations that families, expansively defined to
include opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitees, will be the primary
source of responsibility for economic dependency-rather than the state.
Moreover, Canadian legal policy has achieved this goal without the need
to enact legislation encouraging marriage.
C. Converging/Diverging Principles in Current Family Law and
Policies
This overview of recent Canadian developments reveals how courts
have significantly contributed to an expanded definition of "families."
Using the constitutionally-entrenched equality guarantee in the Charter,
courts have responded positively to a number of claims presented by
opposite-sex cohabitees and by gay and lesbian activists for legal
recognition of their "families," including entitlement to marry. However,
such claims for judicial recognition of same-sex families have generally
been designed to attain equal access to the benefits of "family status,"
many of which were previously available only to families involving
marriage and/or heterosexual cohabitation. Yet, as this overview has also
demonstrated, courts have at the same time been redefining
107. Seeid. at 485,514.
108. Id. at498.
109. See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002, H.R. 4737, 107th
Cong. § 103 (2002) (authorizing grants to the states specifically to "promote and support healthy,
married, 2-parent families").
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responsibility for economic dependency within families, including "post-
divorce families," and in shifting primary responsibility away from the
state by creating "new family obligations" for dependency. Unlike the
same-sex family status cases, which have been driven by principles
reflecting fundamental human rights and equality, the cases that have
defined "family obligations" have reflected courts' increasing
recognition of the reality of economic need, particularly for women and
children post-divorce or separation, and they have been decided against
a political backdrop of declining levels and categories of eligibility for
social security. Although there has not been much political debate about
roles and responsibilities for economic dependency in Canada, courts
have responded to clear and demonstrable needs by creating "new family
obligations." In this way, judicial decisions about "new families" and the
evolving jurisprudence about "new family obligations" appear to have
converged to expand not just the rights, but also the obligations, of
Canadian families, including same-sex families.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, may
signal changes in these judicial views about "new families" and "new
family obligations." In Gosselin v. Quebec,110 for example, the court
reviewed a legislative scheme in Quebec that significantly reduced the
level of welfare benefits payable to recipients who were under thirty
years of age, unless they participated in education or work experience
programs."i ' A majority of five to four held that the age distinction,
which determined different levels and qualifying criteria for persons
over age thirty, by contrast with the claimant and others who were under
age thirty, did not violate the equality guarantee of the Charter.112 The
majority concluded that the ameliorative purpose of creating incentives
for young persons in receipt of social assistance to participate in
education and work programming removed the possibility of
discrimination:
Even if one does not agree with the reasoning of the legislature or with
its priorities, one cannot argue based on this record that the
legislature's purpose lacked sufficient foundation in reality and
common sense to fall within the bounds of permissible discretion in
establishing and fine-tuning a complex social assistance scheme. Logic
and common sense support the legislature's decision to structure its
social assistance programs to give young people, who have a greater
110. [2002] 221 D.L.R.4th 257.
111. Seeid. at276.
112. See id. at 275-309. The arguments focused not only on the section 15 equality protection,
but also on the guarantee of "liberty" and "security of the person" in section 7. See id. at 301-04.
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potential for long-term insertion into the workforce than older people,
the incentive to participate in programs specifically designed to
provide them with training and experience.
In addition to this approach to Charter protection for equality,
which seems to insulate from judicial scrutiny any program for which
the government can identify beneficent objectives, the court also rejected
the claimant's arguments that the government's failure to provide
sufficient places for education and work opportunities for all social
assistance recipients under thirty consigned her to living in poverty.'
14
Interestingly, it was the views of a dissenting judge that revealed that the
rationale for this treatment of recipients under the age of thirty was a
governmental assumption that they would receive assistance, particularly
in relation to housing, from their parents.115 Yet, as Justice Bastarache
concluded, "no effort was made to establish what living conditions were
and a presumption was adopted that all persons under [thirty] received
assistance from their family." 1 6  Unfortunately, this normative
assumption about "family obligations" was untrue for Ms. Gosselin, so
that she was forced to live on an amount of social assistance that was
less than the amount defined by Qudbec legislation as the basic survival
amount. 17 Thus, by contrast with the Ontario court's decision in
Falkiner, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gosselin appears to
reinforce the scope for governments to shift responsibility for economic
dependency to families, and to legislate on the basis of normative
assumptions about "family obligations," whether they really exist in fact
or not.
However, the outcome in Gosselin was achieved by a close vote,'
18
with a number of dissenting opinions," 9 a feature that may suggest a
significant divergence of opinion among judges on the court. By
contrast, much greater unanimity was evident in another recent decision,
Nova Scotia v. Walsh, 20 where eight of nine judges confirmed that Nova
Scotia legislation did not violate the equality guarantee of the Charter
when it restricted access to the statutory property-sharing regime to
113. Id. at290.
114. See id. at 291-92.
115. See id. at 360-61.
116. Id. at 361 (Bastarache, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 361-62 (Bastarache, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 275-309.
119. See id. at 309-24 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., dissenting), 324-85 (Bastarache, J., dissenting);
386-424 (Arbour, J., dissenting), 424-37 (Lebel, J., dissenting).
120. [2002] 221 D.L.R.4th 1.
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married couples who separated or divorced.'12 Walsh and her opposite-
sex cohabitee had lived together for ten years and they were the parents
of two children, but her cohabiting partner held title to most of the
accumulated property of the relationship. 122 Thus, at separation, Walsh
applied for a declaration that her exclusion from the statutory regime,
which entitled each party to a marriage to an equal share of accumulated
property, violated her Charter equality rights. 123 Although the appellate
court in Nova Scotia had unanimously upheld her claim, 12 4 the Supreme
Court concluded, with one dissenting opinion, that Walsh had not
suffered discrimination on the basis of her status as a cohabitee. 125 Thus,
the court held that there was no violation of Walsh's equality rights
pursuant to the Charter.
Did Nova Scotia v. Walsh signal a new direction in the court's
views about "new families" or "new family obligations?" In responding
to this question, relationships between Walsh and some of the earlier
cases must be assessed. For example, there were obvious similarities
between the plaintiff's claim to be a "spouse" pursuant to an insurance
policy in Miron v. Trudel,126 and Walsh's claim to be a "spouse" for
purposes of accessing property-sharing principles in the provincial
statutory scheme at separation. In both cases, opposite-sex cohabitees
were seeking legal recognition for their "spousal" relationships, even
though they were not married. 127 Moreover, since opposite-sex
cohabitees had long been recognized in legislative provisions across
Canada,128 it was widely expected that the court would decide that the
exclusion of opposite-sex couples in Walsh violated the Charter.29 In
addition, since the Supreme Court of Canada had held in 1999 that the
distinction between opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitees violated the
equality guarantee in the Charter,'30 a decision that the exclusion of
opposite-sex cohabitees from the statutory scheme for property-sharing
121. Seeid. at36.
122. See id at 14.
123. See id.
124. See generally Walsh v. Bona, [2000] 183 N.S.R.2d 74.
125. See Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Walsh, 221 D.L.R.4th I at 36; see id. at 37-89 (L'Heureux-
Dub6, J., dissenting).
126. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
127. In both Miron and Walsh, legal recognition of these claims did not result in courts
creating new financial obligations for governments by extending such benefits to new categories of
families, a concern that has often been used to distinguish the differing outcomes in Miron, and
Egan. See text accompanying notes 34-45.
128. See Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 499.
129. See R. Thompson, Annotation to Nova Scotia v. Walsh, R.F.L.
130. SeeM. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 26-27.
2003]
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
at separation contravened the Charter's equality guarantees appeared
likely to apply to same-sex cohabitees as well. In this context, a decision
confirming the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal would have
significantly enhanced the convergence of legal principles applicable to
married couples, opposite-sex couples, and same-sex couples at the point
of separation or family breakdown.
By contrast with this reasoning, however, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the exclusion of opposite-sex couples from access to
the statutory scheme for property-sharing at separation did not violate
the Charter's equality guarantee, and distinguished Miron.131 According
to the court, Miron represented a claim against a third party in which the
opposite-sex cohabitees were in agreement about the nature of their
relationship, while Walsh involved a claim by one cohabiting partner
against the other in circumstances where they had chosen to cohabit,
rather than to marry.' 32 For the majority of the court, the opportunity for
individual choice in defining "families," whether by marriage or
cohabitation, was critical:
Where the legislation has the effect of dramatically altering the
legal obligations of partners, as between themselves, choice must be
paramount. The decision to marry or not is intensely personal and
engages a complex interplay of social, political, religious, and financial
considerations by the individual. While it remains true that unmarried
spouses have suffered from historical disadvantage and stereotyping, it
simultaneously cannot be ignored that many persons in circumstances
similar to those of the parties, that is, opposite sex individuals in
conjugal relationships of some permanence, have chosen to avoid the
institution of marriage and the legal consequences that flow from
it.... To ignore these differences among cohabiting couples presumes
a commonality of intention and understanding that simply does not
exist. This effectively nullifies the individual's freedom to choose
alternative family forms and to have that choice respected and
legitimated by the state.
1 33
By contrast with this majority view, Justice L'Heureux-Dube's lone
dissenting opinion focused on evidence of the rise in the numbers of
cohabiting relationships in Canada, 134 arguing that "[t]he increased
incidence of heterosexual unmarried cohabitation as a means by which
children are raised and socialized and as a form of economic, emotional
131. See Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Walsh, [2002] 221 D.L.R.4th 1, 32-33.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 28-29.
134. See id. at 56-58 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., dissenting).
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and social interdependence dictates some form of recognition of the
functional equality displayed by both heterosexual married and
unmarried cohabitants. 1 35 Moreover, she expressly rejected the
government's argument that the distinction in the legislation reflected
different choices that were defined by the agreements between married
couples by contrast with those of cohabitees about the nature of their
relationships:
[T]he fact that marriage gives rise to legal obligations does not, by
itself, signal that the source of those obligations is some bargained-for
exchange or the product of a consensus. While the price of a haircut is
known in advance and can be contracted for (with a higher price for
perms than for brushcuts), the same cannot be said about marriage. The
marital relationship changes over time. Houses and other assets are
bought and sold, one of the partners is promoted or loses their job,
children are bom, accidents occur, or a member of the family becomes
ill. These and other events are rarely anticipated at the outset and
appropriately bargained for. Further, neither spouse can anticipate who
will contribute what to the marriage. As a consequence, even the most
intelligent of adults lacks the capacity to evaluate the commitments
involved in any agreement dealing with the consequences of a
dissolution that will only come after great change occurs in the
relationship.
136
Citing empirical research in the United Kingdom about the wide
range of intentions among heterosexual cohabitees,1 37  Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 suggested a need to take account of the fact that:
[T]he choice not to marry is not a matter belonging to each individual
alone. The ability to marry is inhibited whenever one of the two
partners wishes to marry and the other does not. In this situation, it can
hardly be said that the person who wishes to marry but must cohabit in
order to obey the wishes of his or her partner chooses to cohabit. This
results in a situation where one of the parties to the cohabitation
relationship preserves his or her autonomy at the expense of the
other .... Under these circumstances, stating that both members of the
135. Id. at 58 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., dissenting); see also LAW REFORM COMM'N OF NOVA
SCOTIA, FINAL REPORT: REFORM OF THE LAW DEALING WITH MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY IN NOVA
SCOTIA 21 (1997) (discussing changes to the laws of property-sharing at separation as necessitated
by the functional equivalent of heterosexual married and unmarried cohabitants).
136. Walsh, 221 D.L.R.4th at 65 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 67 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting) (citing Carol Smart, Stories of Family Life:
Cohabitation, Marriage and Social Change, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 20, 50 (2000)).
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relationship chose to avoid the legal consequences of marriage is
patently absurd.
138
Interestingly, in 2003, the Supreme Court also allowed the appeal
from the Ontario Court of Appeal in Miglin, with the majority
concluding that choices reflected in private agreements between
divorcing spouses should be respected, particularly where both spouses
were represented by counsel in their negotiations. 139 By contrast, the two
dissenting judges articulated the problems of vulnerability and economic
need for such spouses, particularly women. 140 Thus, like the Supreme
Court's decision in Walsh, the views in Miglin also emphasized ideas of
choice in the formation and dissolution of different kinds of family
relationships. Moreover, while Walsh appears difficult to reconcile with
the Supreme Court's earlier decision in M v. H., which recognized a
violation of the Charter's equality guarantee in the differential treatment
accorded to opposite-sex and same-sex relationships for purposes of
spousal support at the end of the relationship, 141 some of the views
expressed by the majority in Miglin may signal a different approach to
spousal support principles enunciated in Bracklow. As a result, these
cases raise perplexing questions: is it significant that the claim in Walsh
concerned property while the claim in M v. H. concerned only spousal
support? More fundamentally, what is the significance of "choice" for
individuals who are involved in "family" relationships, and for
governmental obligations to provide support for dependency? How
should individual choices about family relationships and state regulation
of the consequences of such choices be connected, if at all, in the
twenty-first century?
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING "FAMILIES" AND "FAMILY OBLIGATIONS"
Particularly as a result of the "same-sex marriage" cases, the federal
government in Canada is now actively involved in reviewing the status
of marriage. In the discussion paper issued by the federal Department of
Justice in 2002, the government has suggested three alternatives,
138. Walsh, 221 D.L.R.4th at 68 (L'Heureux-Dubd, J., dissenting).
139. See Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 2003 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 23 at *84-106.
140. Seeid. at*182-93.
141. See M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 26-27. Significantly, one partner in M v. H. was seeking
entitlement to spousal support at the breakdown of the relationship, while the other partner objected
to being treated as functionally similar to opposite-sex cohabitees for this purpose. See id. at 30, 42.
On its face, this claim appears substantially similar to the situation in Walsh, in which one partner
was claiming access to property-sharing principles available to married couples, while the other
partner resisted.
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including the status quo (marriage only between a man and a woman),
and secondly, the extension of marriage to same-sex couples. 142 The
"third option" proposed would eliminate legal marriage, and replace it
with "registered partnerships"; although the third option would not
prohibit religious ceremonies of marriage, such ceremonies would have
no legal impact in the absence of registration. 143 However, the discussion
paper's proposals have been substantially overtaken as a result of the
judicial decisions about same-sex marriage in Ontario and British
Columbia, and federal legislation concerning marriage is expected to be
introduced in Parliament in 2004, following release of the decision in the
government's constitutional reference to the Supreme Court of
Canada. 144 On the basis of the jurisprudence, it seems likely that Canada
will enact same-sex marriage legislation applicable to all provinces and
territories, although any such legislative proposals will also continue to
attract political controversy. 1
45
By contrast with recommendations focusing explicitly on marriage,
a broader perspective about defining families in Canada was proposed
by the Law Commission of Canada in 2001.146 Although the
Commission's report has not attracted much discussion in the context of
the same-sex marriage decisions in the courts, it was considered
carefully in the lower court decision in Ontario. 147 Indeed, the options
proposed by the Commission persuaded Justice Blair that the issues
should be addressed by legislatures so as to take into account the range
of possible reforms to the law of marriage. 148 According to the
Commission, "marriage" law should respect values of equality,
autonomy, and choice in personal adult relationships, and its recognition
of these relationships should ensure certainty, stability, and publicity. 4
Although conceding that marriage currently demonstrates some of these
142. See generally LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 13.
143. See id. at 26. This proposal would require agreement between the federal, provincial and
territorial governments, because of the division of legislative authority for "family law" in Canada.
See id. All references to marriage would be eliminated and federal divorce law would apply only to
existing marriages. Registered partnerships and their breakdown would be governed by provincial
law. See id
144. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
145. See id.
146. See LCC REPORT, supra note 13; see also LEGAL RECOGNITION, supra note 13, at 8 n.4.
(stating that "further study would be needed before Parliament can decide whether it is appropriate
to treat non-conjugal relationships in the same way as spouses or common-law partners in all federal
laws").
147. See Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), [2002] 215 D.L.R.4th 223.
148. See id. at 375-76 (Blair, R.S.J., concurring).
149. See LCC REPORT, supra note 13, at xi, xv-xvi.
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features, the Commission concluded that it was no longer sufficient
because it does not "respond to the variety of relationships that exist in
Canada today": older people living with adult children, adults with
disabilities living with their caregivers, or cohabiting siblings, whose
relationships may also be "characterized by emotional and economic
interdependence, mutual care and concern and the expectation of some
duration." 50
In considering how to foster these differing relationships, the Law
Commission's report reviewed four arrangements: private contracts (the
only model available to conjugal and non-conjugal relationships outside
marriage); ascription; registration; and marriage. Interestingly, in the
context of recent decisions in the Supreme Court of Canada, the Law
Commission's report identified serious disadvantages with private
ordering in personal relationships: problems of inadequate knowledge
and inaccessible legal advice, as well as issues of potential inequality
between the parties. As the report noted, "[t]he contractual model may
respect the value of autonomy but often falls short of fulfilling other
values such as equality or efficiency since too few individuals are
prepared to negotiate the terms of their close personal relationships.' 5',
In addition, it assessed the ascription model as less useful because it
must treat all relationships as just the same; thus, it is "a blunt policy
tool in that it treats all conjugal relationships alike, irrespective of the
level of emotional or economic interdependency."'' 52 By contrast with
these models, the report suggested that registration would permit greater
personal autonomy, while providing models for achieving the partners'
goals.
A registration scheme provides a way in which a broad range of
relationships, including non-conjugal relationships, can be recognized,
while also promoting and respecting the value of autonomy. A
registration scheme has a number of advantages specifically related to
the value of autonomy and choice. In such a scheme, rights and
responsibilities are based on the mutual and voluntary decisions of the
individuals in the relationship. 153
In addition to individual autonomy with respect to such registered
partnerships, however, the report also recognized a continuing state




153. Id. at 117-18.
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relationships: "[t]he state should ensure that the reasonable expectations
of partners are not undermined on the breakdown of the relationship."
154
The report also carefully addressed the fourth model: marriage. 55
At the outset, it assessed the continuing role for marriage in the context
of proposed registered partnerships, suggesting that it was advantageous
to remove the link between marriage and legal consequences: "[b]y
establishing a civil registration scheme open to all persons in committed
relationships, the state could focus more clearly and effectively on
accomplishing the underlying objective currently accomplished
incompletely by marriage, namely, recognizing and supporting
committed personal adult relationships by facilitating an orderly
regulation of their affairs.' ' 156 Yet, as the report also noted, this
recommendation may be inconsistent with established patterns of
marriage in Canada, since civil marriage ceremonies now constitute a
growing proportion of marriages solemnized in many parts of the
country.157 Partly for this reason, the report also considered the
desirability of requiring a civil marriage for legal consequences (as is the
custom in a number of European jurisdictions). 58 More significantly,
however, the report reviewed the arguments about same-sex marriage
and concluded that the reservation of marriage to heterosexual couples
can no longer be justified.
There is no justification for maintaining the current distinctions
between same-sex and heterosexual conjugal unions in light of current
understandings of the state's interest in marriage. The secular purpose
of marriage is to provide an orderly framework in which people can
express their commitment to each other, receive public recognition and
support, and voluntarily assume a range of legal rights and obligations.
The current law does not reflect the social facts: as the Supreme Court
of Canada has recognized, the capacity to form conjugal relationships
characterized by emotional and economic interdependence has nothing
to do with sexual orientation.... If governments are to continue to
maintain an institution called marriage, they cannot do so in a
discriminatory fashion.1
59
Such comments reveal both a functional analysis of the nature of
family relationships as well as recognition of new normative principles
154. Id. at 120.
155. See id at 123-31.
156. Id. at 123.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 126.
159. Id. at 130.
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for governing the state's relationships to families. Interestingly,
moreover, the views of the Law Commission's report are similar to the
results of opinion polls in Canada, conducted between June 1999 and
June 2001, which revealed "that between [forty] percent and [sixty-five]
percent of Canadians [then] favour[ed] recognition of same-sex
marriages."'160 In such a context, however, it is also clear that
individuals' aspirations for recognition of their "new families" in
accordance with the Charter's human rights protections are increasingly
congruent with the state's interest in transferring "new family
obligations" for economic dependency to families. As a result, some
Canadians may wish to embrace judicial decisions which grant the
dignity of legal recognition to "new families," while lamenting at the
same time the privatizing agenda of governments that are abandoning
public responsibility for economic dependency by implementing "new
family obligations." In the result, the level of financial support for
dependency is entirely determined by the economic resources of former
family members, and economic relationships must continue long after
emotional ties may have shattered, or at least fluctuate as time and
circumstances change. In this way, the concerns identified by the two
scholars, one American and one Canadian, at the outset of this Article
clearly represent similar and significant challenges for family law and
policy in both countries. At the same time, the current policy contexts in
our two countries differ significantly: while the American government
wishes to promote marriage as a panacea for welfare problems, and to
exclude same-sex partners from entitlement to marry, recent trends in
Canadian courts and legislatures appear to be in flux in relation to issues
about family and state obligations for dependency, but recognition of
same-sex marriage appears very likely. Moreover, the report of the Law
Commission of Canada suggests that there are fundamental issues about
families, and their relationships to law, which require serious
consideration in both of our countries. In such a context, there may be a
continuing need for all of us to examine "lessons beyond borders."
160. Id. at 136 n.58.
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